Job Market Paper
Board Gender Diversity and Firm Performance: Evidence from Supply-Side Shocks in China (with Yangming Bao)
This paper identifies a positive causal effect of board gender diversity on firm performance by utilizing unique historical events in China. Specifically, the Famine resulted in an evident gender gap in the supply of qualified directors of certain cohorts. Since the shocks differ in both gender and cohorts, we construct a novel "Diff-in-Diff" instrumental variable and a Bartik instrument for board gender representation. We find that a 10% increase in board female representation can lead to a 2.38% increase in return on assets (ROA). Moreover, our results support the critical mass theory and indicate that female directors are beneficial by lowering risk levels and improving solvency.
This paper identifies a positive causal effect of board gender diversity on firm performance by utilizing unique historical events in China. Specifically, the Famine resulted in an evident gender gap in the supply of qualified directors of certain cohorts. Since the shocks differ in both gender and cohorts, we construct a novel "Diff-in-Diff" instrumental variable and a Bartik instrument for board gender representation. We find that a 10% increase in board female representation can lead to a 2.38% increase in return on assets (ROA). Moreover, our results support the critical mass theory and indicate that female directors are beneficial by lowering risk levels and improving solvency.
Working papers
The More the Merrier? The Effect of Fertility Preference on Marriage Outcomes
This paper analyzes how fertility preference affects individuals' marriage outcomes. By using the selective Two-child Policy in China, which relaxed Han Chinese and only child's birth quota hence made them more attractive, I find that after the policy, the treatment group is more likely to marry same-type spouses to have more children. Moreover, to meet their fertility preference, Han Chinese and only child men searched longer and bought more expensive houses before the marriage, and transferred more to their wives in terms of income and education.
Cooperation or Competition? Local Officials' Turnover and Economic Performance in China (with Fangying Xu)
This paper explores the frictions of the dual official system by employing prefectural level mayor and party secretary (PS) data of 334 cities from 2000 to 2010 in China. We find that the combination of a "newcomer" and an "incumbent" negatively affects the local GDP, GDP per capita and fiscal revenue in the following year. The impact is stronger if the "newcomer" is a PS. We interpret this as a new appointed PS may also affect local economic affairs by intervening personnel decisions of mayor's subordinates. In addition, we do not find evidence of changing both officials at the same time on economic performance indicating that the friction only exists between "incumbents" and "newcomers".
The Effect of Returnee Managers on Firm Performance and Policies: Evidence from China (with Thorsten Schank)
This paper analyzes how fertility preference affects individuals' marriage outcomes. By using the selective Two-child Policy in China, which relaxed Han Chinese and only child's birth quota hence made them more attractive, I find that after the policy, the treatment group is more likely to marry same-type spouses to have more children. Moreover, to meet their fertility preference, Han Chinese and only child men searched longer and bought more expensive houses before the marriage, and transferred more to their wives in terms of income and education.
Cooperation or Competition? Local Officials' Turnover and Economic Performance in China (with Fangying Xu)
This paper explores the frictions of the dual official system by employing prefectural level mayor and party secretary (PS) data of 334 cities from 2000 to 2010 in China. We find that the combination of a "newcomer" and an "incumbent" negatively affects the local GDP, GDP per capita and fiscal revenue in the following year. The impact is stronger if the "newcomer" is a PS. We interpret this as a new appointed PS may also affect local economic affairs by intervening personnel decisions of mayor's subordinates. In addition, we do not find evidence of changing both officials at the same time on economic performance indicating that the friction only exists between "incumbents" and "newcomers".
The Effect of Returnee Managers on Firm Performance and Policies: Evidence from China (with Thorsten Schank)